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Finance 
B,uying High and 
Selling Low 
in the Lodging-Property Market 
The prices of lodging properties are influenced by the motivations and knowledge level 
of the parties on both sides of transactions. 
by John  B. Corgel  and 
Jan A. deRoos 
EACH YEAR ownership of 
hundreds of U.S. lodging proper- 
ties is transferred in the real- 
estate market. In theory, the 
mutually agreed upon sale price 
for a property is based on the 
buyer's and the seller's financial 
© 1994, Cornen University 
goals, their investment outlook, 
and their knowledge of the 
property's characteristics. That 
price is strongly influenced by the 
physical characteristics of the 
property (e.g., number of rooms, 
restaurants, pools, etc.), its 
location relative to other land 
uses, and the economic onditions 
of the market in which it is 
located. Physical, locational, and 
economic factors cumulatively 
generate income or loss and cause 
value changes over time. 
Property prices relate directly 
to property fundamentals. The 
John B. Corgel, Ph.D., is an 
associate professor of properties 
management at the Cornell 
University School of Hotel Admin- 
istration, where Jan A. deRoos, 
Ph.D., is an assistant professor of 
properties management. 
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analysis of those fundamentals 
underlies both traditional and 
currently applied approaches to 
property valuation in the real- 
estate-appraisal profession. 1 
Because the physical, locational, 
and economic aspects of a mid- 
market hotel, for example, are 
observable and the cash flows 
from operations and future sales 
may be estimated by the buyer 
and seller using standard finan- 
cial-analysis techniques, the 
buyer should be able to avoid 
overpaying for a hotel and the 
seller should be able to avoid 
selling a hotel too cheaply. 
Extending this theoretical rgu- 
ment to the general case of all 
lodging-property sales, neither a 
buyer's nor a seller's wealth 
should be abnormally enhanced 
or reduced as the result of any 
transaction. 
But not all buyers and sellers 
are equal. Some buyers are better 
informed than others about the 
local economic onditions that 
affect property prices. Some 
sellers are not as adept at nego- 
tiation as others. Some parties in 
transactions are more motivated 
than others to complete transac- 
tions in a timely manner and may 
pay more or accept less for 
expediency. Japanese hotel 
buyers during the late 1980s, for 
example, are thought o have 
overpaid for properties, perhaps 
because of their strong motiva- 
tion to place money in the U.S. 
real-estate market when it was 
booming, perhaps because they 
wished to obtain trophy proper- 
ties, or perhaps because they 
made purchase decisions without 
good information about key 
property and market fundamen- 
tals. 2 The Resolution Trust 
Corporation (RTC) is another 
example. Some believe that 
political pressure from Congress 
pushed the RTC into selling 
property from its portfolio quickly 
and cheaply instead of waiting 
until the real-estate market 
recovered. 
To show that a particular type 
of buyer overpaid or that a seller 
undersold in the lodging-property 
market, however, is far too 
general a finding to be useful to 
market participants. If some 
buyers pay premiums and some 
sellers offer discounts, do these 
outcomes persist in all transac- 
tions in which a specific type of 
participant is involved? Suppose 
buyer premiums and seller 
discounts are the result of mis- 
takes. The root causes of such 
"errors" should be of interest o 
market participants who want to 
fill information gaps and exploit 
inefficiencies. Some foreign 
buyers, for example, are known 
for their careful examination of
the physical characteristics of 
properties, but because of their 
foreign residency, they may not 
astutely evaluate how local 
market economics affect real- 
estate prices or they may unduly 
weight such factors as residual 
property value much more 
heavily than do sellers based in 
the United States. Armed with 
the knowledge of how mistakes 
are made, brokers and consult- 
ants may be of better service to 
these buyers by providing de- 
tailed local market information. 
In this article we explore the 
idea that the transaction price 
1 For a summary of appraisal methodology, see Stephen Rushmore, Hotels and Motels: 
A Guide to Market Analysis, Investment Analysis, and Valuations (Chicago: Appraisal Institute, 
1992), chapter 5. 
2 "Why Japanese Buyers Pay a Premium for Hotels," The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1991, 
p. B1. See also: M. Chase Burritt, "Japanese Investment in U.S. Hotels and Resorts," Cornell 
Hotel and Restaurant Administrat ion Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3 (October 1991), pp. 60-66; and 
Tadayuki Hara and James J. Eyster, "Japanese Hotel Investment: A Matter of Tradition and 
Realty," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administrat ion Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (November 1990), 
pp. 98-104. 
may be different for a given 
lodging property in the case of 
one buyer and seller pair relative 
to another. The findings reported 
here are from a statistical explo- 
ration that is made possible by a 
large database of lodging-prop- 
erty transactions that occurred 
throughout the United States 
during the late 1980s and early 
1990s. We begin with a discussion 
of previous research on the 
influence of buyers and sellers on 
property prices, then we present 
the findings from our study and 
their implications. 
What We Already Know 
Property-rights heory suggests 
that private contracts do not 
influence real-estate prices in 
competitive markets unless the 
contracts affect he underlying 
property rights. Private contracts 
including leases, management 
agreements, franchise agree- 
ments, and contracts for sale are 
outside the realm of rent and 
price formation unless they 
restrict he use of the property. 
For example, a contract for sale 
accompanied by a deed that 
restricts owners' rights to use a 
property only as a hotel would 
diminish value because of the 
options it destroys. 
Only recently has serious 
testing begun on the effect of 
private contracts on value. 
Sirmans and Sirmans present 
some evidence that professional 
management has a positive effect 
on monthly apartment rent2 
Shilling, Sirmans, Turnbull, and 
Benjamin provide somewhat 
stronger evidence that contin- 
gency clauses in contracts for sale 
lead to significant increases in 
the prices of houses (such clauses 
often involve the ability to obtain 
G. Stacy Sirmans and C.F. Sirmans, 
"Property Management Designation and 
Apartment Rent," Journal of  Real Estate 
Research, Winter 1991, pp. 91-98. 
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financing and the sale of the 
currently owned property). 4 
However, Hanson was unable to 
find differences between the 
ratios of operating income to 
replacement costs for hotels 
affiliating with a chain and 
engaging a management company 
versus independent hotels. 5
Corgel also could not establish 
that the franchise affiliations of 
hotels had a statistically signifi- 
cant effect on hotel-sale prices. 6
Each contract for sale repre- 
sents the agreement on price and 
terms reached by a specific buyer 
and seller combination. The idea 
that the price of a lodging prop- 
erty may be different in the case 
of one buyer and seller combina- 
tion compared to another is 
rooted in the belief that buyer 
and seller characteristics influ- 
ence price formation even though 
property rights have not been 
disturbed. In theory, a given 
buyer behaves differently from 
other buyers and a given seller 
behaves differently from other 
sellers for three reasonsJ First, 
each buyer and seller is capable 
of pricing errors because neither 
buyer nor seller has all the 
information about every property 
in the market hat is necessary to 
set a perfect price for any single 
property. Second, buyers and 
sellers are not equally patient. 
Some sellers, for example, are 
overly eager to sell and thus sell 
4 James  D. Shil l ing, C.F. S i rmans,  Geoffrey 
K. Turnbul l ,  and John  D. Benjamin,  "Hedonic 
Prices and Contractua l  Contingencies," Journal 
of Urban Economics, Ju ly  1992, pp. 108-118. 
~' Bjorn Hanson,  "An Exploratory Study of 
Operat ing  Income Relative to Replacement Cost 
for A l ternat ive Combinat ion of Affi l iation and 
Management  for Mid-Size and Ful l-Service 
Hotels," Ph.D. diss., New York University,  1991. 
G John  B. Corgel, "Brand Name Affi l iation 
and Real Estate Prices," work ing paper,  School 
of Hotel Administrat ion,  Cornel] University,  
1992. 
7 A formal presentat ion of the reasons for the 
differences in buyer  and seller behavior  is found 
in Daniel C. Quan and John  M. Quigley, "Price 
Format ion and the Appra isa l  Funct ion in Real 
Estate Markets,"  Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics, J une  1991, pp. 127-146. 
EXHIBIT 1 
Classification of buyers and sellers 
CLASSIFICATION CODE* 
I. Individual or husband and wife 
II. Partnerships 
a. Limited partnership--public 
b. Limited partnership--private 
c. General and other partnerships 
III. Domestic hotel corporations 
IV. Domestic real-estate corporations 
V. Domestic non-real-estate corporations 
VI. Domestic institutions 
a. Life-insurance companies 
b. Banks 
c. Savings and loan companies 
d. Resolution Trust Corporation 
e. Other institutions (pension, government) 
VII. Foreign individuals, partnerships, banks, 
hotel companies, and real-estate companies 
Individual 
Ltd. Partner 
Ltd. Partner 
Gen. Partner 
Hotel Co. 
Real Estate Co. 
Corporation 
Life Co. 
Bank 
S&L 
RTC 
Pension 
Foreign 
*These codes are used in subsequent exhibits to identify specific buyer and 
seller classes. Note that some subclassifications were combined. 
at low prices while other sellers 
are willing to wait for their price. 
Finally, there are strategic 
reasons why market participants 
may be willing to transact for the 
same property at different prices. 
A hotel company, for instance, 
may value a property higher than 
an individual because of the 
competitive edge the property 
provides to the brand. 
The corporate-finance litera- 
ture is rich with evidence that the 
values of securities are affected 
by the presence of investors 
driven by tax and leverage 
clienteles. Maris and Elayan 
review this l iterature and find in 
their study a tax-induced clien- 
tele that is willing to pay more for 
equity REITs2 We know of only 
one study that addresses these 
issues in the market for real 
estate that does not involve 
securities. During the 1980s some 
real-estate-market observers 
believed that limited-partnership 
syndications overpaid for proper- 
ties to gain maximum tax subsi- 
dies for limited partners. Holding 
other factors constant, Beaton 
and Sirmans accept he null 
Brian A. Mar is  and Fayez A. E layan,  "A 
Test for Tax- Induced Investor  Clienteles in Real - 
Estate Investment  Trusts ,"  Journal of Real 
Estate Research, Summer  1991, pp. 169-189. 
hypothesis that the prices paid 
for apartments by different types 
of buyer organizations are equal2 
In other words, their data indi- 
cate that the form of the buyer's 
organization is unrelated to the 
price paid. 
Data on Lodging-Property 
Transactions 
Our statistical study of the effects 
of buyers and sellers on lodging- 
property sale prices relies on a 
large database of hotel and motel 
transactions. For this purpose, a
property is defined as a hotel if it 
includes at least 150 rooms, 
meeting and banquet space, and 
restaurant facilities. The data are 
national in scope and include a 
large proportion of the lodging- 
property transactions that oc- 
curred during the period begin- 
ning in the first quarter of 1985 
and ending in the last quarter of 
1992. The data are detailed with 
respect o property characteris- 
tics, location, and local economic 
information. Buyers and sellers 
in the transactions are identified 
so that they may be classified 
(see Exhibit 1). 
Wil l iam Beaton and C.F. S i rmans,  "Do 
Syndicat ions Pay  More for Real Estate?," 
Journal of the Real Estate and Urban Econom- 
ics Association, Summer  1986, pp. 206-215.  
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EXHIB IT  2 
Mean values of selected characteristics from 
lodging-property transactions 1985-1992, 
by buyer classification 
BUYER CLASSIFICATIONS 
SELECTED PROPERTY Hotel Real-Estate Other 
CHARACTERISTICS All Buyers Individual Partnership Corporation Corporation Corporation 
All periods (1985-1992) 
Number of transactions 
Cash equivalent price 
Percent hotel (versus motel) 
Age of property 
Distance to airport 
Distance to commercial center 
1,314 
$11,010,126 
44.5% 
15.8 Yr. 
15.7 Mi. 
4.9 Mi. 
273 
5,646,353 
17.5 
19.3 
19.8 
5.3 
406 
9,893,522 
48 
14.2 
14.7 
4.9 
221 
10,014,587 
55.6 
16.7 
13.9 
4.6 
211 
8,603,001 
46.9 
14.5 
14.9 
4.9 
78 
7,976,053 
44.8 
14.3 
14.6 
5.7 
Institution Foreign 
51 74 
20,060,977 ~ 43,721,381 
60.7 74.3 
12.8 15.9 
14.9 I 14.1 
i 3.7 I 4 
Early period (1985-1986) 
Number of transactions 
Cash equivalent price 
Percent hotel (versus motel) 
Age of property 
Distance to airport 
Distance to commercial center 
350 
$11,742,123 
50% 
14.6 Yr. 
12.9 Mi. 
4.9 Mi. 
59 
6,667,962 
27 
16.3 
16.7 
5.5 
142 
12,058,662 
52 
14.6 
10.9 
4.9 
50 
8,372,469 
58 
14.5 
16.8 
4.9 
65 
12,401,650 
61 
12.6 
11.2 
5.4 
16 14 
12,023,753 '!23,353,036 
43 50 
16.4 11.8 
12.4 14.5 
2.6 4.3 
4 
64,987,500 
50 
24.5 
8.6 
1 
Middle period (1987-1989) 
Number of transactions 
Cash equivalent price 
Percent hotel (versus motel) 
Age of property 
Distance to airport 
Distance to commercial center 
534 
$12,495,720 
44.5% 
16.3 Yr. 
15.9 Mi. 
5.6 Mi. 
109 
8,657,491 
13 
21.4 
18.5 
6.4 
156 
11,329,130 
52 
13.3 
16.2 
5.5 
103 
11,277,690 
54 
17.1 
13.2 
5 
70 
7,365,196 
38 
16 
15.6 
5.2 
51 
7,414,263 
47 
13.8 
14.3 
5.2 
18 ~ 27 
31,737,604 49,449,387 
77 74 
13.8 17.7 
15.9 17.3 
4.7 6.9 
Late period (1990-1992) 
Number of transactions 
Cash equivalent price 
Percent hotel (versus motel) 
Age of property 
Distance to airport 
Distance to commercial center 
430 105 
$8,569,4141 1,946,459 
39.9% i 16 
16Yr. ~ 18.7 
17.6 Mi. 22.9 
4.9 Mi. :; 3.9 
108 
4,973,109 
35.2 
14.8 
17.7 
4.2 
68 
9,308,796 
55.9 
17.9 
13 
3.9 
76 
6,494,239 
42.1 
14.7 
17.7 
4.3 
11 
4,693,150 
36.3 
13.5 
18.7 
12.1 
19 
6,573,182 
52.6 
12.7 
14.2 
2.2 
43 
38,146,482 
76.7 
14.1 
12.6 
2.5 
The primary source of transac- 
tion information is the database 
of the Hospitality Market Data 
Exchange (HMDE) maintained by 
Hospitality Valuation Services 
(HVS). The HMDE contains the 
sale price, number of rooms, date 
of sale, and general-location i for- 
mation for several thousand prop- 
erties. Some information about the 
characteristics of the properties, 
such as average room rate, age, 
amenities, and the conditions of 
the sales (e.g., financing terms 
and the organization forms of 
buyers and sellers) were obtained 
during visits to the HVS office. 
Other data were gathered from 
the following sources: 
• Hotel & Travel Index, the 
AH&MA Hotel and Motel Red- 
book, and Mobil Travel Guides; 
• Members of the Hotel and 
Motel Brokers Association; 
• Telephone interviews with 
hotel and motel managers; 
• Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
U.S. Bureau of the Census; and 
• Sales and Marketing Manage- 
ment magazine. 
The database comprises more 
than 1,300 transactions. Although 
the sample was not randomly 
chosen, efforts were made to avoid 
concentrations ofproperty sales 
by quarter, geographic region, 
chain affiliation, and other prop- 
erty characteristics. 
Approximately 40 percent of 
the sales in the database are 
omitted from consideration for 
parts of this study because 
average daily rate and occupancy 
statistics are unavailable or the 
property has extraordinary 
characteristics, uch as casino 
gambling. 
Perspective 
A broad perspective on behavioral 
differences among participants in 
lodging-property markets is 
gained from the descriptive 
statistics presented in Exhibit 2. 
Although the exhibit presents 
only averages for selected charac- 
teristics of transactions across 
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buyer classifications, it reveals 
quite clearly that different buyers 
favor different ypes of properties. 
Not surprisingly, individuals 
generally purchase lower-price 
properties, primarily older motels 
that are at a greater distance 
from commercial centers and 
airports than the average. At the 
other end of the buyer spectrum 
are institutions and foreigners 
who favor high-price hotels. 
Institutions eem to be especially 
interested in newer hotels. 
Partnerships, hotel corporations, 
real-estate corporations, and 
other corporations represent a 
large and rather homogeneous 
middle class of buyers. During 
the period 1990 through 1992, 
however, there was greater 
diversity in the buying behavior 
of those entities. 
Insight on the behavior of 
lodging-property-market par ici- 
pants is gained from an examina- 
tion of the prices they paid and 
received. Holding all other factors 
constant, we investigated the 
effects of unique buyer and seller 
factors on aggregate prices. More 
specifically, we determined which 
effects on pricing of particular 
property characteristics, such as 
room rate or age of property, 
caused the different classes of 
buyers to overvalue or under- 
value a property. By effects we 
mean overpayment by buyers 
and underselling by sellers (i.e., 
selling too cheaply). 
We use multivariate-regression 
procedures to determine the 
effects of buyers and sellers on 
prices while holding other factors 
constant. The model has the 
following general form: 
S i = S (P i '  L,, El, Qi, Ti, Xi, Yi; ~,  e) ,  
where: 
• S i is the cash equivalent sale 
price of the i th property; 
• Pi is a vector of property 
characteristics of the i th prop- 
erty at the time of sale; 
EXHIBIT 3 
Buyer and seller effects on sale prices of lodging properties 
Buyers Sellers 
DISCOUNT PREMIUM PREMIUM I 
(OVERPA~o) I 
All periods Individual i 
1985-1992 Ltd. Partner 
(n = 781 ) Foreign i 
.................................................................................................... i 
Early period Individual 
1985-1986 Corporation 
(n = 206) Life Co. 
S&L 
Middle period Individual 
1987-1989 Ltd. Partner 
(n = 371) Hotel Co. 
Foreign 
Late period Individual 
1990-1992 Foreign 
(n = 204) Hotel Co. 
Bank 
Gen. Partner 
Real Estate Co. 
Bank 
Life Co. 
Gen. Partner 
Hotel Co. 
Foreign 
i Gen. Partner 
~ Bank Life Co. 
! S&L 
i Life Co. 
I Ltd. Partner 
Gen. Partner 
i Pension 
Hotel Co. 
Corporation 
Foreign 
Bank 
Pension 
Foreign 
Individuals 
Ltd. Partner 
Hotel Co. 
Corporation 
Ltd. Partner 
Corporation 
i DISCOUNT 
~ (UNDERSOLD) U 
RTC 
Life Co. 
~ S&L 
~, Ltd. Partner 
Gen. Partner 
': S&L 
Life Co. 
RTC 
i Bank 
S&L 
Life Co. 
i RTC 
• L i is a vector of locational 
characteristics of the i th 
property at the time of sale; 
• E i is a vector of economic 
characteristics of the local area 
in which the ph property is 
located at time of sale; 
• Q~ is an unobserved quality 
measure of the i th property at 
the time of sale; 1° 
• T i is the year of sale of the i th 
property; 
• X is a vector of buyer classifica- 
tions, one buyer class for the 
i th property; 
• Y is a vector of seller classifica- 
tions, one seller class for the i th 
property; and 
• B, e are estimated parameters 
and the error terms of the 
model, respectively. 
Exhibit 3 shows which buyer 
classes paid premiums or gained 
discounts and which sellers re- 
ceived premiums or gave dis- 
counts in the lodging-property 
market during the study period. 
~0 This measure is the output from a room- 
rate regression. Readers who are interested in 
knowing how this measure is produced should 
consult John B. Corgel and Jan A. deRoos, 
"The ADR Rule-of-Thumb as Predictor of 
Lodging Property Values," International 
Journal of Hospitality Management, No. 4, 
1994, pp. 353-365. 
The determination asto whether 
premiums or discounts occurred 
comes from the regression coeffi- 
cients for the X and Y variables. 
Although the procedure is some- 
what complicated, essentially it
involves identifying buyer and 
seller classes that either pay or 
receive 10 percent more and 
identifying buyer and seller 
classes that either pay or receive 
10 percent less than the theoreti- 
cally correct prices predicted by 
the regression model. 
As indicated in Exhibit 3, some 
buyers consistently bought 
lodging properties at premiums, 
particularly individuals and 
foreign buyers, and some sellers 
consistently sold at discounts, 
particularly financial institutions 
and the RTC. These are not 
shocking results. Theory tells us 
that the less-informed buyers will 
err by overpaying and the less- 
patient sellers will let properties 
go at discounts. 11
Fortunately the data allow for a 
more penetrating analysis than 
~ It is assumed that domestic partnerships, 
corporations, real-estate corporations, hotel 
corporations, and financial institutions are 
more-informed buyers than individuals and 
foreign buyers. 
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EXHIB IT  4 
Price (implicit) premiums and discounts of buyers and 
sellers for selected property characteristics 
Buyers Sellers 
PREMIUM DISCOUNT PREMIUM I DISCOUNT 
(OVERPA,o) i (U.OERSO,~) 
Room Rate Partnership i None i None 
Number 
of Rooms 
Age 
of Property 
Chain Affiliation 
Distance 
to Airport 
Distance to 
Commercial 
Center 
Employment 
of Local Area 
Effective Buying 
Income of Local 
Area 
Individual 
None 
None 
Foreign 
Bank 
Corporation 
Foreign 
{ 
i Foreign 
' Real Estate Co. 
Bank 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Partnership 
Bank 
RTC 
None 
Corporation 
Corporation 
None 
None 
RTC 
Hotel Co. 
Partnership 
Hotel Co. 
i Real Estate Co. 
None 
i None 
I Bank 
RTC 
Bank 
None 
that just described. The results 
presented in Exhibit 4 are inter- 
esting because they yield informa- 
tion about he characteristics that 
encouraged buyers to pay premi- 
ums and sellers to accept dis- 
counts. Partnerships, for instance, 
paid more per dollar of room rate 
than other buyers. Likewise, indi- 
viduals paid more per room, for- 
eign buyers paid more for proxim- 
ity to an airport, and banks paid a 
premium for proximity to commer- 
cial centers. A proper interpreta- 
tion of the results is that some 
buyers were willing to pay signifi- 
cantly more on average than oth- 
ers for additional units of the par- 
ticular characteristics they sought. 
Where did financial institutions 
and the RTC go wrong as sellers in 
the lodging-property markets? The 
analysis of property characteristics 
suggests that these sellers ac- 
cepted less than the market was 
willing to pay for proximity to com- 
mercial centers and airports and 
for property located in areas with 
greater effective buying income. 
Discounts, however, were partially 
offset by premiums received for 
room rate and local-area employ- 
ment strength. 
The Right Price 
Prices of lodging properties are 
influenced by the behavior of par- 
ties on both sides of transactions. 
Price discounts and premiums 
seem to result from buyers' and 
sellers' information-gathering ca- 
pabilities, bargaining skills, and 
patience. As we expected, individu- 
als consistently paid premiums for 
properties. These premiums are 
positively related to the number of 
rooms in a given property. Also as 
we expected, some foreign buyers 
paid premiums based on the 
weight hey gave to the effective 
buying income of the local area 
and a property's proximity to an 
airport. Finally, financial institu- 
tions and the RTC discounted the 
properties they sold as compared 
to the price they might have com- 
manded in consideration ofthe 
location and local economic ondi- 
tions. The implications of our find- 
ings are as follows: 
(1) When appraisers apply the 
sales-comparison approach to 
value, they are justified in adjust- 
ing comparable sales to account for 
buyer and seller influences. 
(2) Brokers are better able to 
demonstrate he value of their 
services, particularly in pricing 
properties for buyers and finding 
high-paying buyers for sellers. 
Agents or brokers with access to 
up-to-date data can recommend 
certain courses of action based on 
the most recent ransactions avail- 
able for comparable deals. 
(3) Lenders hould be more 
careful when issuing loans to cer- 
tain classes of buyers for particu- 
lar types of properties. For ex- 
ample, if an individual (or group of 
individuals) seeks to purchase a
large hotel, the lender may wish to 
offer a loan at a slightly lower 
loan-to-value ratio than the lender 
would offer to other borrowers. 
This study does not answer two 
important questions. First, do all 
buyers and sellers in a class be- 
have in the same way? Aggrega- 
tion of market participants into 
classes is a limitation of the study. 
Foreign buyers, for example, are 
not a homogeneous group and the 
results in Exhibits 3 and 4 tend to 
confirm that foreign buyers behave 
differently from one another (e.g., 
foreign buyers did not overpay 
during 1985-86). Disaggregation 
of this and other classes of buyers 
and sellers was not possible due to 
sample-size problems. 
Second, do the premiums and 
discounts associated with classes 
of buyers and sellers persist 
through time? Another limitation 
of the study is that the results 
tend to be time specific. Some mar- 
ket participants are only in the 
market for a brief period (e.g., 
RTC) and other market partici- 
pants will learn from their previ- 
ous behavior. 
The data are constantly improv- 
ing and future studies using more 
complete data sets should not be 
burdened with the same limita- 
tions as this study, cO 
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